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In the past year there have been many new developments in the
bankruptcy area for lawyers who practice in the Seventh Circuit. Bankrupt-
cies and reorganizations filed in the Seventh Circuit have increased almost
25 percent in the past year and 70 percent since 1973. Whether this is a
result of the economy, the energy crisis, or merely an increase in the public
awareness and acceptance of bankruptcy remains uncertain, but the trend,
despite the "recovery", continues.
With the filing of more complex cases under Chapter XI, the entire
proceeding has continued to evolve from a procedure designed for debtors
with large unsecured debt but insignificant secured debt to a procedure
whereby debtors with large secured debt but minor unsecured debt can
ingeniously hold secured creditors, landlords and equipment lessors in line
and persuade them to accept something less than that to which they might
feel they are entitled. In addition, in the last six months there have been
more Chapter XII cases filed than since the days of the depression.
In answer to this turbulent setting the bankruptcy bar has adapted itself
to the new Chapter XI rules, effective July 1, 1974, and the newer Chapters
X and XII rules, effective August 1, 1975. During the same time the
Seventh Circuit has been busy handing down many important bankruptcy
decisions addressing the thorny problems which confront the bankruptcy bar.
While this article will not review every Seventh Circuit decision, it will focus
on the more important decisions involving reclamation, attorneys' and ac-
countants' fees, and creditors' standing in the bankruptcy court.
RECLAMATION
The Illinois Uniform Commercial Code, section 2-702,1 gives the seller
a right to reclaim goods he sold the bankrupt buyer when the seller discovers
that the buyer had received goods on credit while insolvent. 2 The demand
for the return of the goods, however, must be made within ten days of the
buyer's receipt of said goods. Too many times the hapless seller's credit
* Associate, Jenner & Block; member of the Illinois Bar; J.D., University of Chi-
cago.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-702 (1973).
2. Id. Section 2-702(2) states:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within 10 days after
the receipts. ...
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manager does not hear of the buyer's financial embarrassment until long
after the ten-day period has elapsed. Subsection (2) of section 2-702 also
provides that if written misrepresentations of solvency have been made to the
seller by the buyer within three months of delivery of the goods the ten-day
limitation does not apply.3
The Seventh Circuit took a hard look at the seller's right to reclaim
after the ten-day period expired in the matter in In Re Creative Buildings,
Inc.4 In that case, the seller had transacted business with the buyer since
June, 1969. In late 1971 the buyer gave the seller two checks, one for
$47,859.23 dated November 19, 1971, and the other for $9,900.76 dated
December 1, 1971. Both checks were returned to the seller stamped not
sufficient funds (N.S.F.). The first check was paid when re-presented,
however, and the seller subsequently redeposited the second check. On
January 5, 1972, the seller, based upon (1) the payment of the first check
and assumed payment of the second check, (2) the oral assurances of the
buyer, and (3) a promise by the buyer that a solvent third party would pay
for the goods, shipped additional goods to the buyer on credit. The seller
did not know that the second check had again failed to clear the bank. It
was subsequently returned N.S.F. at the end of the month. On January 28,
1972, the buyer filed for an arrangement under Chapter XI of the Bankrupt-
cy Act. The seller did not file a demand for reclamation of the goods until
March 9, 1972. Since the ten-day period had expired, the seller contended
that when the debtor had given it an N.S.F. check in November and
December, 1971, it had "ceased to pay its debts in the ordinary course of
business" and had demonstrated that it would not pay its debts as they
became due, and thus was insolvent. 5
The seller also alleged that the debtor was insolvent under the Bank-
ruptcy Act definition. 6  The court found there was no evidence that the
debtor was insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, but it struggled with the
question of whether it should accept a strict literal meaning of the UCC
definition of insolvency and hold that when a debtor has one of its checks
returned to the payee marked N.S.F. it has ceased to pay its debts in the
regular course per se. The court objected to the application of the strict
3. [B]ut if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within 3 months before delivery the 10-day limitation does not
apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right
to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentations of
solvency or of intent to pay.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-702(2) (1973).
4. 498 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1974).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-201(23) (1973) states:
A person is "insolvent" who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970) states:
A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever
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literal meaning of the words of the Code. 7 It found that there are a variety
of business transactions in which for one reason or another N.S.F. checks
issue either through mistake, miscalculation, good faith reliance by the
drawer on anticipated income, or other more or less innocent circumstances.
8
Although the court could have concluded that checks and other negotiable
instruments could never be representations of solvency, it backed away from
such a strong conclusion and presented a test under which a check or note
could be considered a representaiton of solvency. In so doing, the court
looked to section 2-702 which on its face requires (1) a written (2)
misrepresentation of solvency (3) made within three months of delivery (4)
to the particular creditor who is attempting to rescind the contract. 9
There was no doubt that the check was a writing, nor was there any
question that the seller satisfied the last two requirements. The key issue of
the case was whether a check is a representation of solvency. Some courts
have held that a check is an implicit representation that the seller is solvent
and that the check will be paid. 10 The official comments to the Illinois
Uniform Commercial Code state that any acceptance of goods by the buyer
on credit is a tacit representation of solvency.1 ' Thus, when a writing is
received in conjuction with a receipt of goods, the check stands all the more
as a representation of solvency. In considering its opinion, the Seventh
Circuit looked to the law of Illinois as interpreted by the Illinois Appellate
Court in Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Savings Bank.12 The appellate
court had stated:
Although [section] 2-702(2) does not so prescribe in express
terms, an implicit requirement of the section is that the particular
writing be treated as a representation by the seller. While the
check can comply with the literal requirements of a writing, i.e.,
in writing, addressed to the particular seller and dated within three
months of the delivery, unless the writing is treated by the seller
as a representation, he should not be accorded the benefit of the
section.
the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have
conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted to be concealed or re-
moved, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors, shall not at a fair
valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts.
7. 498 F.2d at 2.
8. 498 F.2d at 3. See also Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Savings Bank,
103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1968).
9. 498 F.2d at 3; see In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc., 452 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1971).
10. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir.
1974); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 32 Colo. App. 235, 511
P.2d 912, 914 (1973) (dissenting opinion); Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Say.
Bank, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 914 (1968).
11. The Official Comment to section 2-202 states that subsection (2) takes as its
base line the proposition that any receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer
amounts to a tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent as
against the particular seller.
12. 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 242 N.E.2d 911 (1968).
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At least one indication of treatment of a writing as a represen-
tation is whether the seller relied upon the writing as an element
in determining its course of dealing with the buyer. Sec[tion] 2-
702(2) does not specifically require reliance; however, the concept
is present by implication. In reasonable commercial expectation,
the seller does not expect his buyer to be insolvent, and relies on
this expectation.
Official Comments indicate that any receipt of goods on credit
is a tacit representation of solvency. Thus if reliance was not rele-
vant in any case, the presence of a writing as a determinative factor
would be meaningless. Cases decided in Illinois involving misrep-
resentation in commercial transactions are of guidance here, and
can properly be considered, as above noted. 1 3
The appellate court further noted, in determining whether a party had a
right to rely on false representations, that the representation had to be
viewed in light of the facts of which the injured party had or could have had
knowledge of through the exercise of ordinary prudence.14
'If treatment by the seller of the writing as a representation and reliance
by the seller were not necessary, section 2-702(2) could be utilized to
protect a seller who knows full well that his buyer is insolvent but continues
to sell to him and then reclaims the property when the buyer does not pay as
promised or when another party appears on the scene.' 5 Section 1-203 of
the UCC requires dealing in good faith. This requirement would not be met
by the conduct just described and would seem to require that a seller not be
able to profit by such a course of conduct.' 6
The Seventh Circuit found that if the payment of the first check by the
buyer upon representment induced the seller to release the goods on credit,
then the requisite standard of reliance would have been satisfied. But, the
court also found that the seller had relied on oral representation, especially
upon the statement that a solvent third party was to pay for the goods. Thus,
it concluded that there was no reliance by the seller upon the check.
The court further noted that the very fact that the checks had been
returned N.S.F. the first time should have been a "red flag" in front of the
seller's face that the buyer was on a shaky footing. For the buyer to have
proceeded the way he did was an act of foolhardiness.
Thus the Seventh Circuit established a test that the seller must have
relied principally on the writing and that the reliance was in good faith and
in the exercise of prudent and knowledgeable business judgment. Where a
13. Id. at 195, 242 N.E.2d at 915. See also American Merchant's Union Exp. Co.
v. Willsie, 79 Ill. 92 (1875); Schweizer v. Tracy, 76 l. 345 (1875).
14. 103 II. App. 2d at 195, 242 N.E.2d at 915, citing Moral v. Masalski, 333 111.
41, 164 N.E. 205 (1928).
15. 103 Ill. App. 2d at 196, 242 N.E.2d at 915.
16. Id.; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-203 (1973).
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seller can make out the rather formidable burden of proof, the Seventh
Circuit holds that he would be entitled to reclamation. 17
The court took a realistic approach to the commercial world. First,
few, if any, credit managers exclusively consider the issuance of a check to
be prima facie proof of solvency. Credit managers often look to a number
of other written and oral representations: credit bureau reports, past experi-
ence, and the plain desire to gamble to make money. To hold that the
decisions of credit managers hinge on the issuance of a check by the buyer
borders on fantasy.
Second, the court protected section 2-702 from complete subversion by
the ambitious sellers with a heads, seller wins, tails, buyer loses, philosophy.
If the mere issuance of an N.S.F. were to be considered a written representa-
tion of solvency upon which reclamation could be ordered under section 2-
702, then the ten-day rule would never be of any use in N.S.F. check
transactions.
The decision is consistent with that of other contemporary courts. The
court left the door open to the reasonable interpretation that if the seller can
meet the burden of proof he is entitled to reclamation. 18 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit's restriction of the meaning of section 2-702 was appropriate.
CREDITOR'S STANDING
Although creditors normally are given the opportunity to appear in
bankruptcy court to participate in the proceedings and to object to the
adjudication of the bankrupt or the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, an
involuntary petition of bankruptcy places the creditor on a different footing.
In Carlson Plywood Co. v. Vytex Plastics Corp.19 the Seventh Circuit opined
that a creditor has absolutely no right to challenge an involuntary petition
either directly or indirectly.
In that case the bankrupt, Vytex, filed a petition in the state court
praying for an order of liquidation and the appointment of a state court
receiver. Subsequently, three of Vytex's creditors filed an involuntary
petition and Vytex consented to being adjudicated a bankrupt. Carlson, one
of the non-petitioning creditors of Vytex, filed an action in the federal
district court to enjoin the bankrupt from proceeding in the bankruptcy court
and to dismiss the bankruptcy petition. The basis for Carlson's collateral
attack was that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to grant the petition
17. One seller did just that in Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp.,
490 F.2d 114 (10th cir. 1974).
18. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir.
1974); In re Bar-wood, Inc., 73-334-BK-WM-H, 15 UCC REP. SERV. 828 (S.D. Fla.
1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., Inc., BK 0-22-72, 14 UCC REP. Ssxv. 96 (S.D.
Ia. 1973).
19. 519 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1975).
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and that Vytex could not consent to the involuntary petition because of the
appointment of the state court receiver.
The federal district court rejected Carlson's claim on the grounds that it
should have objected to the petition in the bankruptcy court -rather than
proceeding with a collateral attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but for a
different and more fundamental reason: Carlson lacked standing to chal-
lenge the adjudication both in the district court and in the bankruptcy court.
In reaching this result, the court looked to the history of the Bankruptcy
Act and the decisions of other circuits that have dealt with this issue.
The filing and adjudication of the bankrupt is governed by section 18b
of the Bankruptcy Act.20  As originally enacted in 1898, the Act provided
that "It]he [b]ankrupt or any creditor [could] appear and plead to the
petition within five days after the return day or within such further time as
the court may allow."' 21  In 1938, however, the words "or any creditor"
were deleted by the Chandler Act.
In re Carden22 was the first post-Chandler Act case to consider this
question. The court held:
Since there is no longer any express statutory right given cred-
itors to contest an adjudication upon the involuntary petition in
bankruptcy, the right, if any, of creditors to make such a contest
must rest upon general principles of equity applicable in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. It is true that such principles will govern ac-
tion in the bankruptcy court when not in conflict with the statute.
But where there has been an amendment to the statute whereby
such right formerly existing has been withdrawn, there has
been the equivalent of a statutory denial of the right and any ac-
tion under general principles of equity contrary thereto would be
contrary to the statute and so erroneous. Consequently the appel-
lant was without standing to question the sufficiency of the peti-
tion.2 3
The reasons for the change were stated in the House Report.
The right of creditors to file an answer and oppose the petition
has been eliminated in the amendment of section 18b and section
59f has been changed to correspond with this amendment. A cred-
itor should not be permitted to oppose an adjudication; invariably,
the motive of such a creditor is to protect a preference or to retain
some other undue advantage at the expense of the other creditors,
20. 11 U.S.C. § 41(b) (1970):
The Bankrupt and, in the case of a petition against a partnership, any general
partner or, in the case of a petition in behalf of a partnership, any general
partner not joining therein, may appear and plead to the petition within five
days after the return day or within such further time as the court may allow.
21. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 18b. See also 2 COLLIER ON BARuPTcY
18.33 [1] at 106 (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
22. 118 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1941).
23. id. at 679 (citation omitted).
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contrary to the fundamental purpose of the Act-an equitable dis-
tribution among all creditors. 24
Subsequently, other circuits followed Carden in denying the creditor the right
to appear in bankruptcy court to plead or object to the adjudication. 25
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that if Carlson had proceeded
initially in the bankruptcy court it would have been without standing. The
second question was whether Carlson could do indirectly what it could not do
directly.
The court acknowledged that creditors cannot oppose an involuntary
adjudication of bankruptcy, either during the proceedings before the bank-
ruptcy court or after completion of these proceedings through a motion to set
aside the adjudication. 26  The troublesome point of this opinion is that if
Carlson's point was correct, the court was utterly without jurisdiction. Several
schools of thought have considered what rights the creditor may have to
object to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
In both In re Jack Kardow Plumbing Co.27 and In re Highley,28 the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits denied the creditor any standing to challenge the
jurisdiction of the court by motion to vacate after adjudication on the
grounds that the intent of Congress was to prevent a post-adjudication
challenge as well as a pre-adjudication challenge.29
Professor Collier takes the position that if the defects of the involuntary
petition are patently jurisdictional, the bankruptcy court may raise the
objection on its own motion and accordingly permit a creditor to appear, not
as a qualified party in interest, but as amicus curiae.30 The Seventh Circuit
stated that it was expressing no opinion as to whether Carlson could have,
short of setting aside the adjudication, objected to the discharge of the bank-
rupt under section 14 of the Act, thus, accomplishing the same end.8 '
24. H. REP. No. 1409 on H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1937). See also
3A COLLIER, supra note 21, f 18.33 at 106. Other grounds may exist, though, for a
creditor to object to an involuntary proceeding, including the exhausting administrative
costs and the protracted time for receiving dividends.
25. In re Gold Metal Packing Corp., 470 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Highley,
459 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1972); In re Jack Kardow Plumbing Co., 451 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir. 1971); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Skutt, 341 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1965).
26. Carlson Plywood Co. v. Vytex Plastics Corp., 519 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir.
1975). See also In re Highley, 459 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1972).
27. 451 F.2d 123, 130 (5th Cir. 1971).
28. 459 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1972).
29. But see In re T.J. Ronan Co., 114 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), which im-
plies that the circuitous route to bypass the problem should be used as it would be in
the voluntary proceedings. Cf. In re Federman, 119 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1941).
30. 2 COLLIEt, supra note 21, 18:47 [3] at 188.
31. The thrust of the complaint is to put a halt to the bankruptcy proceedings.
This would, in turn, involve setting aside the adjudication. While we have de-
termined that Carlson, as a creditor, is without standing to make an attack,
we express no opinion as to whether Carlson in the bankruptcy proceedings
may be in a position to have grounds to oppose a discharge.
519 F.2d at 558 n.1 (citation omitted).
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Although the policy of the 1938 Chandler Act amendments is clear,
some remedy must exist to protect creditors from the costly effects of an
involuntary petition when that petition lacks the requisite jurisdictional
requirements. The policy of the Act was to prevent creditors from delaying
the involuntary adjudication until after the four-month preference period in
section 60 had expired.32 But when that period is tolled by an adjudication,
it would seem that the creditor at that point should have the right to object to
the jurisdiction of the court. Professor Collier's comment that he could file
an amicus curiae brief merely skirts the issue. Allowing the creditor to
object to discharge perhaps allows the creditor the right to terminate the
proceedings, if the court is patently without jurisdiction, without the problem
of exhausting the four-month rule protecting his preference. This would
be a proper result. After all, a creditor in a voluntary proceeding has the
right after adjudication to object to discharge and challenge the jurisdiction
of the court. It would be an anomaly to deny the creditor in an involuntary
situation the same right if the problem of preferences can be overcome.
Thus, the court's lack of guidance as to how a creditor in an involuntary
proceeding may proceed if he cannot set aside the adjudication was disap-
pointing, but the door was left wide open for a future creditor to raise such
an objection.
ATTORNEYS' AND CREDITORS' FEES
One of the most taxing problems facing bankruptcy judges and one of
the most often litigated areas of bankruptcy law is the amount and fairness
of attorneys' and accountants' fees. The Seventh Circuit addressed itself to
this problem in In re Brooks & Woodington, Inc.33 The case started as a
Chapter XI arrangement which was soon aborted. The trustee in bankruptcy
petitioned the court for permission to hire an accounting firm so that the
trustee might have and use a full and comprehensive report on the assets and
liabilities of the bankrupt. The court was given an estimate by the
accountants of $7,500 as the total cost of the project and the court approved
a set of hourly schedules. But the bankruptcy court also extended the scope
of the review to include auditing all of the bankrupt's subsidiaries. The
bankrupt's affairs were hopelessly confused and intertwined with that of its
subsidiaries. Innumerable security interests further clouded the financial
picture. The accountants submitted regular bills and periodical payments
were made to the accountants totalling $34,000. The bankruptcy court
never restricted the right of the accountants to continue their work although
they had far exceeded their own estimates.
When all of the work had been completed the accountants claimed an
additional $23,000 although they had recovered over $700,000 for secured
32. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
33. 505 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1974).
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creditors. The bankruptcy court found that if the fees were paid, the
unsecured creditors would not receive a dividend, but if the fees were
denied, a generous 3.61 percent dividend would,be paid to the unsecured
creditors. Thus, the court concluded that the accountant's fees should be
denied.
In considering the appeal, the Seventh Circuit first paid homage to the
doctrine that the bankruptcy judge's discretion should not be disturbed unless
clearly in error as to law and fact. 34 The court found, however, that the
judge had in fact made an error in both his interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Act and his understanding of the facts.
The first issue considered by the court was whether the accountants
were under an obligation to obtain an order from the bankruptcy court if the
accountants knew that their work would exceed the estimate. 35 In answer-
ing in the negative, the court found that the estimate was not based on the
additional work covered in the order. The bankruptcy judge knew at all times
of the activities of the accountants, their billing rate and the accumulated
time. The bankruptcy judge could have stopped the proceedings at any
time. The court therefore concluded that the application by the accountants
for authority to proceed was not necessary. 36
The court also found that as a matter of law the bankruptcy judge's
conclusion was erroneous. The Eighth Circuit in Killoren v. Boyd, Cronk &
Co.37 considered an almost identical factual situation and held: "He [the
trustee] should not have permitted the firm [accountants] to continue
rendering services which he knew, or ought to have known, were being
performed with the expectation that they would be paid for at the rate fixed
by the court."3 8 The court concluded that even though Killoren involved a
34. The bankruptcy court has the power to decide whether or not to allow compen-
sation and reimbursement out of the estate to a trustee's accountant or attorney. It is
an attribute of the court's exclusive and nondelegable control over the administration of
an estate in its possession. In the normal course of proceedings the referee's discretion
and judgment, if free from error of law and sufficiently supported by the facts, is entitled
to great weight. Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938 an appeal from the bankruptcy
judge's order would have been very difficult and limited in scope. The appeal required
the approval of the appellate court, and was limited to the bankruptcy judge's errors in
law. Section 24 of the Chandler Act authorizes an appeal as of right from a compensa-
tion order in bankruptcy provided that where the order involves less than $500 the
appeal may be taken upon the allowance of the reviewing court. In addition the review-
ing court may examine not only errors in law but may question the bankruptcy judge's
analysis of the facts. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 21, 24.41,[2] at 807.
35. Order No. 45, General Orders in Bankruptcy, abrogated by General Order 49,
provided in relevant part: "No. . .accountant shall be employed by a . . .trustee...
except upon an order of the court expressly fixing the amount of the compensation or
the rate of measure thereof .... ." See also Bankruptcy Rule 215; Chapter X Rule 10-
206; Chapter XI Rule 11-29(b); Chapter XII Rule 12-12; Chapter XIII Rule 13-207.
36. 505 F.2d at 797-98.
37. 119 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1941).
38. Id. at 3.
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reorganization (resurrection of the debtor), the same rule would apply in a
liquidation (burial of the debtor) as well.
The next issue in the case was whether the fact that there would be no
dividend to unsecured creditors should be a determinative factor in denying
the additional fees. The court found that it must weigh two important
considerations: the spirit of economy demanded by the Supreme Court for
the administration of estates39 versus the court's desire to attract competent
lawyers and accountants to the bankruptcy bar by paying them a fair
compensation.
The Seventh Circuit was correct in finding that economy is not equiva-
lent to parsimony when under all circumstances and conditions the fee was
fair and equitable. 40  The court found that the work done by the account-
ants was necessary to the estate, had caused the recovery of $700,000, and
was done in an efficient manner. As stated by the Ninthx Circuit in
Jacobowitz v. Double Seven Corp.,41 "[W]e think that the economical
spirit of the Bankruptcy Act does not require nor justify reducing a requested
fee where as here by all other proper standards it is fair and a reasonable
one."
42
Although the court had to consider as equally important the fact that
the unsecured creditors would be deprived of a dividend, the court conclud-
ed, "[W]e hold as a matter of law that the desire for some dividend to
creditors, if that dividend is only of a token nature, should not override the
commitment lawfully made with those employed on specific terms by the
bankruptcy court."'43 Thus while the decision does not present a controlling
rule, the court makes it clear that it will consider each case on the basis of its
own facts. The court makes it clear that the economic spirit of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is a balancing procedure in which the amount of the dividend
is weighed against the results and efficiency of the accountant's work product.
COST OF CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Not infrequently, particularly in a reorganization proceeding, the estate
requires the services of accountants, lawyers and other professionals. As a
rule, the only attorneys entitled to compensation are the attorneys for the
debtor-in-possession, the receiver, and the attorneys for the statutory credi-
tor's committee. 44
39. Realty Associates Sec. Corp. v. O'Connor, 295 U.S. 295 (1934).
40. 3A COLLIER, supra note 21, I 62.12 [5] at 1485: "In determining the rea-
sonable values of services rendered the following elements are to be considered: the time
spent, the intricacy of the problems involved, the size of the estate, the opposition met,
the results achieved all subject to the economical spirit of the Bankruptcy Act."
41. 378 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1967).
42. Id. at 408.
43. 505 F.2d at 799.
44. Chapter X Rule 10-206; Chapter XI Rules 11-22 and 11-27(b); Chapter XII
Rule 12-28; Chapter XIII Rule 13-209.
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From time to time, either because one of the above enumerated counsel
does not, would not or could not act, an attorney, usually for one of the credi-
tors, volunteers to act for the benefit of the estate. The contributions of such
attorneys are in many cases the sole reason for additional monetary recovery
for the estate or the protection of valuable creditor's rights. The tautologous
question always follows: are the volunteers who serve for the benefit of the
creditors or the estate, but without court order or sanction to act, entitled to
compensation?
The most troubling case of the last term was In re Peerless Manufactur-
ing Co.45 It raised two important questions concerning fees: (1) When the
appointment of a trustee is successfully challenged because his election
violated the Bankruptcy Act, whether the estate (creditors) must pay for his
attorney's fees in defending the challenge, and (2) whether the attorney for
the challenging creditors who vindicates the creditor's rights is entitled to fees
from the estate.
Peerless I
Peerless, like many cases, started as a Chapter XI proceeding which
was soon aborted and adjudicated as a straight bankruptcy. Edward
Limperis was appointed receiver and he retained Louis I. Kessler, an
experienced bankruptcy attorney, as his counsel. At the subsequent first
meeting of creditors, thirteen creditors, whose claims totaled a majority of
the bankrupt's total indebtedness, nominated Sherwin L. Ehrlich as trustee
and one other creditor nominated Limperis. 46  Without a vote on the
nominations, the bankruptcy judge appointed Limperis, who in turn hired
Kessler as his counsel. 47
The thirteen creditors involved, represented by another bankruptcy
lawyer, Joseph Stein, objected to the so-called election of a trustee and filed
an appeal. The district court affirmed, but the Seventh Circuit reversed.48
45. In re Peerless Mfg. Co., 523 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter referred
to as Peerless 11]. Peerless I is reported at 416 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1969).
46. Alex H. Dolnick, an attorney representing Lee Gollub, a creditor, share-
holder and director of the bankrupt, nominated Limperis as trustee. Lee
Gollub as director of the bankrupt was precluded by statute from making any
nomination. Harold Lansing, an attorney representing the only other creditor
participating in the meeting and who had a claim of $1,012 joined in the nom-
ination of Limperis. Kessler, conceding he had no voice in the election of the
trustee, nevertheless objected to the nomination of Ehrlich and took an active
part in supporting the nomination of Limperis.
Brief and Argument for Appellees at 4, In re Peerless Mfg. Co., 523 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.
1975) (citations omitted).
47. The court found among other reasons for rejecting Ehrlich's nomination that
Stein had failed to file affidavits as required in and by rule 10a of the Local Bankruptcy
Rules and Limperis had considerable experience in the bankruptcy field while Ehrlich
had no experience. The court also concluded that Gollub's nomination was valid in light
of its confirmation by Lansing. Bankruptcy Judge McCormick's order of April 29,
1968, Nos. 74-1585, 75-1586.
48. 416 F.2d 57 (7th Cir. 1969).
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Circuit Judge Cummings noted that section 44 of the Bankruptcy Act
provides:
The creditors of a bankruptcy . . . where the bankrupt is a
corporation . . . shall, at the first meeting of creditors after the
adjudication . . . appoint a trustee . . . for such estate. If the
creditors do not appoint a trustee, or if the trustee so appointed fails
to qualify . . . the court [the referee] shall make the appoint-
ment.4
9
The court summarily swept aside the bankruptcy judge's technical objections
and concluded, "One of the highest acts of the creditors is the choice of a
trustee, and . . . section 44a of the Bankruptcy Act clearly confers that
choice upon them." 50
The choice by a bankrupt's creditors of a trustee, although
subject to the approval of the court, should be approved unless
good reason exists for disapproving. If any question exists in the
court's [referee's] mind as to whether the choice of the creditors
should be approved, it may hold a hearing for that purpose. .... 51
The court decided that the appointment of Limperis had deprived the
creditors of their right to vote. As the court noted, "such preemptory
disregard for the desire of the creditors was a plain violation of [s]ection
44a as it has long been constructed."' 52  Upon the remand by the Seventh
Circuit, Ehrlich was elected trustee by the creditors of the bankrupt, and
Stein was appointed attorney for Ehrlich as trustee.
Peerless II
After Ehrlich and Stein were appointed they began an investigation into
claims which had been filed and allowed by the referee upon concurrence
with the trustee. They learned that claims submitted by Gollub and another
officer, director and shareholder of the bankrupt had not been contested by
Limperis and Kessler and orders had been entered approving their claims as
filed. Erhlich and Stein petitioned to have the orders allowing the claims
vacated and, after contested hearings, the orders allowing the claims were
vacated and the claims were denied. The estate thereby saved $29,527.
Another claim of Gollub in the sum of $19,027 was subordinated to the
claims of the general creditors.5 3 Thus, through Ehrlich and Stein's work
the amount of claims against the estate was reduced by $57,710, allowing a
larger dividend to unsecured creditors.
Upon the conclusion of the proceedings, Stein and Ehrlich petitioned for
fees, but the bankruptcy judge denied the bulk of the claim. Kessler and
49. 11 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1970).
50. 416 F.2d at 60 (emphasis added).
51. Id., citing In re Thomas, 263 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1959).
52. Id. (citations omitted).
53. Brief of Stein at 11-12.
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Limperis also applied for fees and the application was granted by the
bankruptcy judge.54  The federal district court, in an opinion issued by
District Judge Frank J. McGarr, remanded Stein's fees to the bankruptcy
court for further proceedings, but denied that Stein was entitled to his fees in
prosecuting his action in favor of the creditors.5 5  Judge McGarr also
reversed the award of all fees to Limeris and Kessler on the grounds that
their appointment was void, ab initio.5 6
Kessler's Fees
Stein advanced four grounds for affirming the district court's conclu-
sion: (1) The protection of the rights of creditors required that fees to
Limperis and Kessler be denied; (2) the order appointing Limperis and
Kessler was void ab initio and thus service rendered under such order could
not be compensated; (3) the services of Limperis and Kessler did not benefit
the estate; and (4) the denial of fees was a proper exercise of discretion. 7
Kessler responded by arguing that his services had benefited the estate and
that as Professor Collier suggests, "In fact, denial of compensation or
reimbursement is a sanction distinctly punitive in character and should be
reserved to cases warranting a moral censure." 8
The Seventh Circuit had long held that when a decree is reversed it is
no longer of any force or effect and the parties are in exactly the same situ-
ation as though no decree had been entered. 59 Despite the court's previous
position Judge Swygert held that vacation of the 1968 order appointing
Limperis as trustee did not mean that his and Kessler's appointments were
invalid in the sense that they should receive no compensation. 60
'Instead of taking the position that for all purposes except fees Kessler's
appointment was void, the court should have taken the position enunciated
54. Ehrlich, as successor trustee, petitioned for fees and expenses in the amount
of $2,412.50 and Stein petitioned for fees of $25,000 plus expenses of $2,225.39.
Stein's petition for fees indicated that he had performed approximately 480 hours
of services, of which 233 hours of Stein's time was spent in the effort to reverse the
bankruptcy's judge's original order. The bankruptcy judge entered his order allowing
fees of $500 to Ehrlich and $8,000 plus costs and expenses to Stein. Kessler applied
to the court for fees of $4,500 and $128.54 in costs and expenses, as attorney for
the trustee, of which the bankruptcy judge allowed $4,000. Of the 151 hours billed
by Kessler, approximately 50 hours were for defending the appeal by Stein. Brief of
Stein at 4-7.
55. Memorandum Opinion and Order of Federal District Court Judge Frank J. Mc-
Garr of April 24, 1974, Nos. 74-1585, 74-1586.
56. Id.
57. Brief of Stein at 8-19.
58. Brief of Kessler at 9, citing 3A COLLIER, supra note 21, at 1472.
59. Kaplan v. Joseph, 125 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1942). See also Quinn v. Gardner,
32 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1929); Willet Co. v. Carpentier, 4 111. 2d 407, 123 N.E.2d 308
(1954).
60. 523 F.2d at 112.
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in In re Stolkin,61 and argued that there were substantial equitable consider-
ations in allowing fees for Kessler although his appointment was not
technically valid at the time he performed the services. The great majority
of Kessler's work was not related to the litigation over the election of the
trustee, but directly and significantly benefited the estate. Thus, the court
was correct when it concluded that to deny all of Kessler's fees would have
been too harsh a result.
But the court argued, in justifying the awarding of Kessler's fees for
defending the appeal, that to deny Kessler the cost of the appeal would be
too great a disincentive for able attorneys such as Kessler to accept such
appointments. The court stated that the attorney has no duty to investigate
the validity of his own appointment, especially when the court calls the
invalidity of the appointment plain and obvious.62  A much better policy
would be to create an incentive for the trustee's attorney as an officer of the
court to report to the court cases of plain error in order that the rights of
creditors be protected. While the court concerned itself with the public
policy ramifications of not compelling attorneys to check the validity of their
own appointments, the court expects that creditors should stand up for their
rights even though head or tails they lose because they have to pay the losing
trustee's attorney's fees.
After the court's decision in In re Brooks & Woodington, Inc.,63 it is
surprising that the Seventh Circuit completely overlooked the criteria it and
other courts have established for determining whether the bankruptcy judge
and the district court judge have abused their discretion in denying fees. The
court should have concluded that the 50 hours Kessler spent defending
Limperis's illegal election did nothing to benefit the estate but, on the
contrary, caused increased administrative expenses, lengthened the time of
administration, and contributed to the frustration of what the Seventh Circuit
called one of the most sacrosanct rights of a creditor, his right to elect a
trustee.
64
Thus, the reading of Peerless I leaves a contradictory result in the
policy of the Seventh Circuit. While the allowance of the bulk of Kessler's
fees were overwhelmingly justified, the policy enunciated in Peerless II chills
any incentive creditors have to protect their rights.
The Appeal of Stein
Stein advanced two theories to justify the award of compensation to an
attorney who does not serve with an order of court,65 the doctrines of
61. 472 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1973).
62. 523 F.2d at 112.
63. 505 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1974).
64. 472 F.2d at 60.
65. General Order 44 of the Bankruptcy Rules, abrogated by General Order 49,
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Randolph v. Scruggs"6 and In re New York Investers.67 Stein initially
argued that the rule of Randolph justified his compensation. Randolph
considered the compensation of an attorney as a common law receiver prior
to bankruptcy and the appointment of a trustee. Collier summarizes the
rule of Randolph as follows:
(1) Persons who rendered service that proved beneficial to the
estate will not be precluded from claiming reimbursement because
they are not, at the time, officers of the bankruptcy court or be-
cause their services were rendered prior to bankruptcy; (2) their
claim will be measured exclusively by the benefit they conferred
on the estate by preserving it intact for the uses and purposes of
a trustee when elected. 68
Although the Randolph case and others69 provide justification for
awarding attorneys' fees when no trustee is appointed, the rule, as described
later, does not justify the award of compensation when a trustee is appointed
and serving. However, the implied premise of Stein's argument was that
since Limperis's appointment was reversed and the order appointing him
vacated, there was no trustee. Thus, Stein by analogy would meet the
requirements of a common law receiver in the Randolph mode if the court
had considered Limperis's appointment void. The court was therefore
correct in rejecting this argument if it were also rejecting Stein's argument in
the Limperis appeal that Limperis, despite the reversal, was until the time of
a new election the legal trustee.
The theory of New York Investors is the culmination of a constant
evolution of bankruptcy law. Courts have long held that the trustee must
perform all of the services required for the administration of an estate and
that compensation could not be awarded from the estate to others (third
party volunteers) unless (1) services by the volunteer benefited the estate;
(2) the trustee refused to act; and (3) formal authorization was procured
from the bankruptcy court to proceed in the trustee's stead.7 0
read in pertinent part:
No attorney for a receiver, trustee or debtor in possession shall be appointed
except upon the order of the court, which shall be granted only upon the veri-
fied petition of the receiver, trustee or debtor in possession, stating the name
of the counsel whom he wishes to employ, the reasons for his selection, the
professional services he is to render, the necessity for employing counsel at all,
and to the best of the petitioner's knowledge all of the attorney's connections
with the bankrupt or debtor, the creditors or any other party in interest, and
their respective attorneys. If satisfied that the attorney represents no interest
adverse to the receiver, the trustee, or the estate in the matters upon which
he is to be engaged, and that his employment would be to the best interests
of the estate, the court may authorize his employment, and such employment
shall be for specific purposes unless the court is satisfied that the case is onejustifying a general retainer ...
66. 190 U.S. 533 (1903).
67. 130 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1942).
68. 3A COLLIER, supra note 21, T 62.03 at 1411-13.
69. E.g., In re New York Investors, 130 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1942).
70. Id.
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The cautious procedures of requiring a preliminary order from the court
as a condition of later applying for payment for service at the expense of the
estate was adopted in order to mitigate, if not completely avoid, the
harrassing importunities of numerous claimants for allowance out of the
estate of the insolvent debtors. It was also adopted to relieve bankruptcy
courts from the embarrassment of passing upon the merits of claims for
compensation after all the services had been performed instead of determin-
ing initially whether the services were such as the trustees or their attorneys
were bound to perform.7 1 Thus, bankruptcy courts have been reluctant to
allow third parties to undertake any action which a trustee could do unless
the trustee refused to act.
New York Investors considered a set of circumstances where the court
was willing to dispose of the final requirement of prior court approval. The
exception was based on the premise that compensation for opposing allow-
ances to trustees and their counsel stands on a different footing from
compensation for opposing allowances to third parties. "Trustees cannot be
expected to take appeals from their own allowances. They are scarcely in a
better position to appeal from allowances to their counsel who would
certainly be unlikely to advise such appeals. '72  The Second Circuit dis-
missed the necessity of obtaining an order by stating:
But it seems to us that the efficient administration of the estate
would have been but little promoted by such a step, even though
it might have been better practice to seek a preliminary order. It
is true that several creditors may seek compensation for opposing
allowances to trustees and their attorneys, and then the very diffi-
culties may arise which an initial order was designed to prevent.
But denial of all compensation in a situation like the present entails
great hardship to the applicant and brings few advantages to offset
this hardship.73
Thus, the Second Circuit established the test that if the question involved is
the trustee's own fees or fees for his counsel, then the attorney for the
creditor who undertook to save the estate money by challenging such fees
would be entitled to compensation.
In response to the compelling language of the Second Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit apparently rejected the equitable consideration brought forth
in New York Investors. But rather than rationalize its rejection of New
York Investors, the court attempted to distinguish the facts in New York
Investors from those in Peerless 11.74
In re New York Investors involved a situation in which the benefit
to all the creditors was a monetary increase in the amount of the
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. 523 F.2d at 111.
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bankrupt's estate. After the allowance of additional attorney's fees
each of the creditors still received a larger award than they would
have had there been no challenge. Our situation is different. The
only direct benefit to the creditors was a vindication of the right
to vote in the election for trustee. Although this is a valuable right,
no actual increase in the amount of the bankrupt's estate resulted
solely from the appellants' successful challenge. 75
Both the court's major premise that a pecuniary increase in the estate is a
condition precedent to compensation and the minor premise that the estate
was not benefited must be questioned. First, the court asserted that only a
pecuniary benefit can justify compensation. It is hard to believe that this is
the same court which enthusiastically asserted that the creditor's right to elect
a trustee is sacrosanct. The court's answer that the creditors right to elect a
trustee is valuable, but cannot be quantified, is a mind-boggling exercise in
double thinking. The court is saying the disfranchisement of creditors is not
as important as collecting a few dollars for the estate.
Neither did the court address itself to one of the important facts of the
case. Stein and Ehrlich upon their appointments as officers of the court had
succeeded, just as the attorneys in New York Investors, in reducing the
claims filed against the estate and challenging the trustees. In dollars and
cents the claims against the estate were reduced by $57,000. Because
Gollub had nominated and supported Limperis, it is highly unlikely that but
for the successful fight of Stein and Ehrlich on behalf of the creditors, those
claims would have ever been challenged and removed. 76 Yet, despite both
the protection of sacrosanct creditors' rights, and the monetary benefit
accruing to the estate, the court concluded that equity did not dictate an
award of fees.
Considering the first appeal of Limperis and Kessler in Peerless I, the
court spoke of the strong public policy in favor of giving lawyers and trustees
incentive to serve in bankrupt estates. Yet, in Peerless II, the court was
unwilling to give any incentive to creditors to vindicate their rights in
bankruptcy even where such a vindication has monetary benefit. There
is no doubt that the court has left only to the very rich the burden of
defending the democratic and monetary rights of creditors in bankruptcy.
The court should have remanded Stein's application for fees to the bankrupt-
cy court for a determination of their fairness in light of the benefits accrued
under the doctrine of New York Investors. Instead, Peerless II stands for
the proposition that even where a creditor's attorney vindicates the rights of
all creditors and minimizes the claims against the estate, the creditor's
attorney will be left unpaid by the estate he protected, but the creditors will
have to pay the fees of the trustee and his attorney who deprived them of
their rights and allowed the invalid claims.
75. 523 F.2d at 113.
76. Limperis had failed to object to the claims initially and the court had allowed
them.
